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Abstract
We consider cartesian categorical (free-variables) theory PR
of primitive recursion and arithmetise (gödelise) it into the
natural numbers set of a classical set theory T. We evalu-
ate the map codes of the coded theory by a general recursive
T map and construct a µ-recursive decision algorithm based
on evaluation of primitive recursive map codes. Within the-
ory T strengthend by p. r. internal inconsistency axiom, the
predicate decision algorithm turns out to be total, terminat-
ing. It decides in a uniform way all diophantine equations




negative solution of Hilbert’s 10th problem. But by Gödel’s
second incompleteness theorem the strengthend theory is rela-
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1 Overview
1. Axioms of cartesian categorical free-variables theory PR
of primitive recursion with equality definability theorem
are recalled. Mentioned is embedding extension of PR
into theory PRa with abstraction of primitive recursive
(“p. r.”) predicates into subsets of objects of PR.
2. Consider a classical, quantified arithmetical set theory T
with quantifiers which has in particular terms for all prim-
itive recursive maps; T is to be one of Principia Math-
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ematica PM or Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZF, or v.
Neumann Gödel Bernays set theory NGB.
3. Theory PRa is gödelised into internal theory PRa ⊂ N
within classical set theorie(s) T.
4. This latter theory admits (general) recursive evaluation
of internal, gödelised theory PRa into T.
5. By use of evaluation it is shown that theory T admits
a µ-recursive decision map/algorithm for decision of p. r.
predicates/subsets.
6. Theory T has a strengthening T̃ = T + ¬ConT of T by
axiom ¬ConT of internal, arithmetised inconsistency.
7. Within theory T̃ the µ-recursive predicate decision al-
gorithm terminates, is totally defined. It decides there
all p. r. predicates into availability of counterexamples vs.
overall truth. It decides there in particular – in a uniform
way – diophantine equations in the sense of Hilbert’s 10th
problem as stated by Matiyasevich.
8. This author’s negative solution of that problem within T,
taken as theorem in stronger theory T̃, contradicts there
(uniform) decidability of diophantine equations.
9. So T̃ must be inconsistent and so are classical set theo-
ries T as well, by Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem




Free-variables cartesian “but” categorical language starts here
with cartesian basic one object 1 and natural numbers object
“NNO” N, and their (nested) formal cartesian products, com-
ing with (formal) left and right projections
` = `A,B : A×B → B and r = rA,B : A×B → B.
We define/interpret free variables as identity maps resp.
left or right projections – possibly nested – out of cartesian
products, onto their factors.
A special rôle is played by terminal object 1. It works as
the empty cartesian product N0, comes with a (unique) “pro-
jection” map Π : A → 1 for each object A, and is the domain
object for concrete “elements” a : 1 → A of A, in particular
for (concrete) numbers n : 1→ N.
We first state the axioms for cartesian theory CA :
f : A→ B
f ◦ id = f ◦ idA = f ;
id ◦ f = idB ◦ f = f
neutrality of identities to composition.
f : A→ B; g : B → C; h : C → D
(h ◦ g) ◦ f = h ◦ (g ◦ f) : A→ D
= h ◦ g ◦ f = h g f = h(g(f(a))))
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associativity of composition.
f : A→ 1
f = ΠA
uniqueness of terminal map.
f : C → A, g : C → B
(f, g) : C → A×B
(unique) induced map into product:

















2.2 Theory PR of primitive recursion
Add to cartesian theory CA iteration axioms:
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f : A→ A (endomap)
f § = f §(a, n) : A×N→ A (iterated);
f §(a, 0) := f §(idA, 0A) = f
§(idA, 0 ΠA) = a = idA :
A→ A×N (anchoring);
f § ◦ (A× s) = f §(a, sn) = f ◦ f § = f(f §(a, n)) :
A×N→ A→ A (iteration step);
fn(a) := f §(a, n)


















f : A→ B; g : B → B; h : A×N→ B;
h(a, 0) = f(a);
h(a, sn) = g h(a, n)
h = g§ (f × idN) i. e.
h(a, n) = gn(f(a)) : A×N→ B :
Freyd’s uniqueness of the iterated endomap g
initialised by map f
3 Evaluation
Crucial for present approach to Hilbert’s decidability problem
is availability – within T as well as in T̃ = T + ¬ConT – of a
(general) recursive evaluation map
ev = ev(χ, n) : [N,2]PRa ×N→ 2 = {0, 1}
on the T-internal (primitive recursively decidable) code set
(gödel numbers set) [N,2]PRa ,




Explication: Primitive recursive predicates are viewed1 as
p. r. maps with codomain 2 ⊂ N within cartesian categorical
(free-variables) theory
PRa = PR + (abstr)
1 Reiter 1982
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of primitive recursion with interpretation of PR predicates as
additional objects, “subsets”. Theory PRa is an embedding
extension of PR.
Evaluation map ev is defined in T by (nested) double re-
cursion à la Ackermann (see Péter 1967), and satisfies – for
p. r. predicate ϕ = ϕ(n) : N→ 2 – the characteristic equation
ev( pϕq , n) = ϕ(n)
Evaluation in detail:
Evaluation family ev = [evA,B : [A,B]PRa × A → B] is
recursively defined by
ev( pbaq , x) = ba(x)
for ba ∈ bas = {0, s} ∪ {ΠA, `A,B, rA,B : A,B objects}
in particular
evN,N(s, n) = s(n)
evA×B,A(`A,B, (a, b)) = `A,B(a, b) = a
as well as recursively
evA,C(g p◦qf , a) = evB,C(g, evA,B(f , a))
evC,A×B(〈f ; g〉, c) = (evC,A(f , c), evC,B(g, c))
evA×N,A(f
p§q , (a, 0)) = idA(a) = a
evA×N,A(f
p§q , (a, sn)) = evA,A(f , evA×N(f
p§q , (a, n))
Objectivity theorem
For f : A→ B in PRa
evA,B( pfq , a) = f(a) : A→ B
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Proof by nested recursion:
anchor: The theorem holds for f ∈ bas by definition of ev.
steps:
evA,C( pg ◦ fq , a) = by def evA,C( pgq p◦q pfq , a)
= evB,C( pgq , evA,B( pfq , a))
= g(f(a)) = (g ◦ f)(a)
by recursion hypothesis
ev( p(f, g)q , c) = by def ev(〈 pfq ; pgq 〉)
= (ev( pfq , c), ev( pgq , c)) = (f(c), g(c)) = (f, g)(c)
by recursion hypothesis
as well as – inner induction on n ∈ N :
anchor:
ev( pf §q , (a, 0)) = by def ev( pfq
p§q , (a, 0))
= a = f §(a, 0)
step:
ev( pf §q , (a, sn)) = ev( pfq p§q , (a, sn))
= ev( pfq , ev( pfq p§q , (a, n))
= ev( pfq , f §(a, n)) by induction hypothesis on n
= (f ◦ f §)(a, n) by recursion hypothesis on f
= f §(a, sn) q. e. d.
9
4 Decision
Define the a priori partial µ-recursive decision map
decis = decis(ϕ) : [N, 2]PRa ⇀ 2 = {0, 1} in T,
ϕ ∈ [N, 2]PR ⊂ formulaeT ⊂ N
via two antagonistic termination indices
µex (ϕ), µthmT(ϕ) : [N, 2]PR → N ∪ {∞} within T as follows:
µex (ϕ) := µ{n : ev(ϕ, n) = 0} “minimal counterexample”
=
min{n : ev(ϕ, n) = 0} if ∃n[ev(ϕ, n) = 0]∞ (undefined) if ∀n[ev(ϕ, n) = 1]
Theorem index µthmT(ϕ) ∈ N∪{∞} of ϕ ∈ [N, 2]PRa is defined
by
µthmT(ϕ) = µ{k : thmT(k) = ϕ}
Here the p. r. enumeration
thmT = thmT(k) : N→ formulaeT ⊂ N
is the T internal version of the p. r. enumeration of all (Gödel
numbers of) T theorems; enumeration is lexicographic by “length
of shortest proof ”.
Finally, we define the – a priori partial – µ-recursive T map
decis = decis(ϕ) : [N, 2]PR ⇀ 2 by
decis(ϕ) =

0 if µex (ϕ) <∞ (“counterexample”)
1 if µex (ϕ) =∞ and µthmT(ϕ) <∞ (T theorem)
∞ otherwise, i. e. if µthmT(ϕ) = µex (ϕ) =∞.
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For proof of decis to be totally defined within T̃ we rely on
the following (trivial)
Lemma (Semantical completeness of T̃ rel. p. r. predicates):
T̃ ` ∀n[ev(ϕ, n) = 1] =⇒ ∃k[thmT(k) = ϕ],
ϕ free on [N, 2]PRa
Proof: One of the equivalent T formulae expressing internal
inconsistency of T is
¬ConT = (∀f ∈ formulaeT)(∃k ∈ N)[thmT(k) = f ]
“Every internal T formula – Gödel number – is provable.”
This gives in particular
T̃ ` ∃k[thmT(k) = ϕ],
ϕ free on [N, 2]PR ⊂ formulaeT q. e. d.
Decision theorem
(i) within T̃ = T + ¬ConT, the (a priori partial) µ-recursive decision
algorithm
decis(ϕ) : [N, 2]PR ⇀ 2
is in fact totally defined, in other words it terminates on all internal
Gödel numbers ϕ ∈ [N, 2]PR .
(ii) For ϕ = ϕ(n) a p. r. predicate, pϕq ∈ [N, 2]PR ⊂ N its gödel number,
decis( pϕq ) gives – in T̃ – the correct result:
• T̃ ` decis( pϕq ) = 0 ⇐⇒ ∃n[¬ϕ(n)],
• T̃ ` decis( pϕq ) = 1 =⇒ ∀nϕ(n).
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Proof of (i):
T̃ ` µex (ϕ) =∞
⇐⇒ ∀n[ev(ϕ, n) = 1]
=⇒ ∃k[thmT(k) = ϕ]
by internal semantical completeness of T̃ above
⇐⇒ µthmT(ϕ) <∞]
Hence not both of µex (ϕ), µthmT(ϕ) can be undefined within
T̃.
This shows termination decis(ϕ) ∈ {0, 1} of decis within T̃
for all internal p. r. predicates ϕ.
Proof of (ii):
T̃ ` decis( pϕq ) = 0
⇐⇒ µex [ pϕq <∞]
⇐⇒ ∃n[ev( pϕq , n) = 0]
⇐⇒ ∃n[ϕ(n) = 0] by ev’s evaluation property
⇐⇒ ∃n[¬ϕ(n)]
as well as
T̃ ` decis( pϕq ) = 1
=⇒ µex pϕq =∞
⇐⇒ ∀n[ev( pϕq , n) = 1]
⇐⇒ ∀nϕ(n) q. e. d.
[if here decis( pϕq ) = 0 = 1 then T̃ is inconsistent and we are
done.]
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5 Hilbert’s 10th Problem revisited
A diophantine equation
[DL(x1, . . . , xm) = DR(x1, . . . , xm)] :
N
m → Nm ×Nm → N×N =−→ 2 = {0, 1}
is equivalent to p. r. predicate
ϕD = ϕD(n)
= [DL(x1, . . . , xm) = DR(x1, . . . , xm)] ◦ cantorNm :
N
∼=−→ Nm → 2
decided as decis( pϕDq ) defined within theory T̃ :
T̃ ` decis( pϕDq ) <∞ (•)
Consider now countable family
[DLα(x1, . . . , xm(α)) = D
R
α (x1, . . . , xm(α))]α∈N
of all diophantine equations: The equations are counted lexi-
cographically by their (finite) polynome-coefficient lists.
Cf. Matiyasevich 1993, 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3. This family
gives rise to p. r. predicates
ϕα = [D
L
α(x1, . . . , xm(α)) 6= DRα (x1, . . . , xm(α))] : Nm(α) → 2
which has property that
(x1, . . . , xm(α)) ∈ Nm(α) is a solution to ϕ(α)
iff it is a counterexample to
Dα = [D
L
α(x1, . . . , xm(α)) = D
R
α (x1, . . . , xm(α))] : N
m(α) → 2
and Dα has no solution (in natural numbers)
iff ϕα holds for (x1, . . . , xm(α)) free in N
m(α)
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From Decision Lemma (for p. r. predicates) above we obtain
Decision Theorem
1. T̃ ` decis pϕαq <∞, α ∈ N free.
Within the – somewhat strange – theory T̃ = T+¬ConT
the (partial) µ-recursive map (the “algorithm”)
decis : [N, 2]PRa ⇀ 2
decides in fact all primitive recursive predicates, in partic-
ular all diophantine predicates as considered above, uni-
formally.
2. Since µ-recursion and Turing machines have equal com-
putation power – by the verified part of Church’s the-
sis – this means: Within T̃, decis gives rise to a Turing
machine TM deciding all diophantine equations, i. e. T̃
admits a positive solution to Hilbert’s 10th problem.
3. On the other hand, Matiyasevich’s negative solution to
this problem works in set theory T,
a fortiori in theory T̃ = T + ¬ConT .
4. The latter two results – Matiyasevich’s negative T the-
orem and our positive T̃ theorem contradict each other
in stronger theory T̃. This shows T̃ to be inconsistent.
5. Gödel’s consistency of ¬ConT relative to T – second in-
completeness theorem – then entails inconsistency of clas-
sical set theorie(s) T.
Outlook: Since Matiyasevich 1993 makes essential use of
formal (existential) quantification for “unsolving” Hilbert’s 10th
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problem, this only decidability problem on Hilbert’s list is again
open – for treatment within the framework of suitable construc-
tive foundations for Arithmetic.
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